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ETHNO-SAFETY POTENTIAL DURING THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN WAR FOR HALYCHYNA IN 1918

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Abstract. Modeling of the potential of the Western-Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) relying on modern theories and suggestions of politicians and geo-politicians is an important factor contributing to the study all the benefits and drawbacks the ethno-political sphere in question, as they show its security and geostrategic components. The author argues that within the proposed model of the potential of the WUPR it was the escalation from the stronger side (Poles), in particular, with the regard to the armaments escalation that was the most logical. It stood out in conditions of asymmetric imbalance: the weaker side (Ukrainians) shifted the "burden" of escalation to ideological and moral-ideological problems.

Keywords: "defensive" and "aggressive" potentials, Ukrainian-Polish war, ethnic security, Halychyna, Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR).

1. INTRODUCTION

Each mature state works on establishing and maintenance of its security and development tasks, in particular, on two fundamental strategies – the national security strategy and the state development strategy. Since a state as a special actor of politics strives to perform certain functions in the field of national security in particular (mission – strategic goals – strategy – means), the design of its security strategy makes an important component of synthetic measures of its potential.

Any kind of strategy, be it long-termed or short-termed, is in need of clearly defined goals and means to achieve them. The "classical" approaches suggest that the armed forces, the wealth of the state (material goods and financial assets, skills, and abilities), and its allies should be seen as indispensable components. Modern world has added a fourth component to this "classical" triad - public opinion which is represented in the modern global communication by different means from periodicals (both printed and electronic) through radio and television to the Internet.

In the chronotope under study, in order to implement national policy during the war the "great" strategy, as British analyst Howard (2001) puts it, relied, on the one hand, on the opportunities for general mobilization, increase of national wealth, development industrial potential and labor resources, and, on the other hand, it depended on cooperation with allies and/or with neutral states if possible. The scholar's ideas resonate with the reasoning of military

historian Liddell Garth. He argues that during the periods when the horizon of strategy is limited due to a war, it makes a great strategy to look forward to the peace that will come after the war (Howard, 2001).

However, in terms of national strategy, according to Cline's (1999) concept, it includes every aspect of a person's life, going beyond those limits where strategy usually stops in the military context alone. Consequently, he believes there arises a need for the term "meta-strategy". It will encompass political, economic, technological, military, psychological and moral forces of a state that wants to fulfill all its objectives in times of both peace and war.

Thus, in order to make a plan of an ethnic security strategy regarding the potential of WUPR-WRUPR (ZUNR-ZOUNR) one should start with establishing whether the Western Ukrainian statehood of 1918–1923 had any strategy in the first place, it being twofold: for the war time in Galicia (Halychyna) (1918–1919) and the peaceful– the failure of the idea of an independent "Galician state" in the international arena (1919–1923). Therefore, this research paper dwells on the former - peculiarities of ethno-security potentials during the Polish-Ukrainian war for Galicia, in particular during the battles in Lviv, November 1–21, 1918.

2. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

It was still November 19, 1918 when Ukrainian politicians stated: "since the beginning of the battle for the capital of Western Ukrainian lands, the spontaneous, almost non-coordinated attack of our army gains a much more united, controlled character under the scrutiny and care of organizations, strategic organizations, and strategic movements, and the same thing happens to establishing organizational forms, content, and spread of formations" (Karpenko & Mytsan (Eds.), 2008).

In his memoirs Kuzma (1960) tried to describe peculiarities of the strategy of Ukrainian defenders of Lviv in November 1918: "The strategic imperative was to reduce and straighten the frontline in order to thereby strengthen the battle line and obtain the necessary reserves. That could only be done at the expense of the enemy, namely through overpowering them on the side fronts" (p. 280). He also summed up: "As for the military actions that would have been a natural continuation of the coup (November action. – I. M.), there was neither a skillful strategic and organizational guide, nor the necessary military force, nor cooperation of the region. [...] To achieve the strategic success (to Gnat Stefaniv – I. M.) it lacked military force" (p. 434). Trying to explain the reasons for the defeat of Ukrainian Lviv after November 21, 1918, Oleksandr Stefanovych pointed out in particular that "it was a grave mistake to undertake the coup d'état in Lviv by means of military units yet never thinks it through in advance in terms for finding professional strategists who would have taken military work into their own hands from the very beginning and skillfully led it" (Karpenko & Mytsan, 2001).

These conclusions could be backed up by Kolodzinskyi (1957) sadly stating: "In the beginning of the Ukrainian Galician Army was revolutionary in nature [...] if they thought to gain control over Lviv on their own and push the battle line to Poland. It seems that that in all the military operations near Lviv, the Ukrainian Galician Army made a respectful and decent impression, as it is done in Europe. The whole siege of Lviv looked like it was made more for the world conference" (p. 50). Analyzing the future events and recalling the Chortkiv offensive, he stated: "We want to win that war (the future one, "that great and brutal war that will make us the masters of Eastern Europe") strategically, not only tactically" (p. 54). In this way he would emphasize not the tactical, but the strategic nature of the national liberation struggle of 1918–1919.

In fact, the huge documentary heritage of the time allows to make the preliminary conclusions that the strategy in general and the ethno-security strategy of the WUPR in particular was treated

too narrowly due to the constant threats of wartime: it was seen exclusively as the potential of the Armed Forces – the Galician Army. The real strategy of the Ukrainian Galician Army was quite exemplary here, and Shankovsky (1974) characterized it as follows: "Those wars in which the Galician riflemen fought undoubtedly go under the category of "defensive" and "fair" wars. The war against Poland was defensive in nature to protect the statehood of the country which had defined itself nationally and stately. [...] In the war against Poland, it was the Galician government [...] that proposed the political and military objectives of the Galician Army. In this case, they were guided by interests of the Galician citizens, and the all-Ukrainian struggle strategy was not the priority" (p. 61, 63).

Therefore, to provide a relatively clear assessment, one should rely on the indicators of national security potentials (BN): "defensive" (PO) and "aggressive" (PA), introduced by Polish international relation specialist Sułek (2004). In his opinion, the "threats" potential (PZ) is measured by dangers – the difference of these opposite potentials:

$$PZ = PA - PO$$

Taking this into account, the situation in which the threat potential (PZ) does not exceed the defense potential (PO) will be considered as the state of national security (BN):

$$PZ \leq PO \rightarrow BN$$

Thus, the first conclusion is that the potential of "threats" is a condition arising from the imbalance of defensive and aggressive potentials. Secondly, if the "threats" potential prevails over the "defense" potential, the state will no longer be safe and will risk losing those values they try to defend (for instance, sovereignty). Thirdly, the "threats" potential will prevail over the "defense" potential in cases when the "aggressive" potential has a double advantage compared to the "defense" potential.

For safety the relative measure of threat and the nominal indicator of threats (zn) will be calculated as: $zn = PZ/PO$

Although the threat indicator will always serve for a rather formal comparison of security potential, the context of the studies of the WUPR – WRUPR (ZUNR-ZOUNR) potential calls for establishing quantitative indicators of the above-mentioned potentials. Obviously, their interpretation will be relative against the background of the above-provided formulas, and it will depend directly on the examples used (human potential, weapons, etc.).

The first of them, the defensive potential of Ukrainians, say, during the November events of 1918 in Lviv: according to Kuzma (1960, p. 394) as of November 21, it consisted of 3305 people in the "combat readiness", including 120 senior officers, 3,185 riflemen (according to Diedyk (2020, p. 95), there were 127 senior officers and 3,404 riflemen with the total amount of 3531 people). According to Diedyk (2020, p. 150), on the same day the total number of Poles would include 246 officers and 3,272 soldiers, as well as 1,954 unarmed people with military background – 5,472 people together (according to Kuzma (1960, p. 393), there were 469 sergeants and 4,404 riflemen in the "combat readiness"). The calculations of human potential prove to be tricky as the Polish troops in Lviv amounted to approximately "6,700 people", while the Ukrainian ones included approximately "4,700 people", according to the estimates of that period. Kuzma (1960) explained the advantage of two thousand people by the ratio according to which there was one Polish officer for 8 soldiers, and on the Ukrainian side there was one officer for 28 soldiers. There is no doubt that this way of counting calls for clarification and fresh data.

In order to understand the scope of the defense potential one must also take into account the state of mobilization readiness and material support of the parties to the military and political conflict. In particular, Shankovskyi (1974, p. 25) believed that there were 180 thousand people who could be mobilized to the Galician Army with 285 thousand people eligible for mobilization. At the beginning of December 1918, the Ukrainian army included 15 thousand people in a "combat

readiness", and in March 126 thousand people were mobilized (Shankovskyi, 1980). The material support of the Galician Army was also weaker: according to different data, the number of military warehouses the Austro-Hungarian army left behind in the hands Ukrainians ranged from 14 to 7, but the amount of military property there was also insignificant (Shankovskyi, 1974, p. 27).

Unlike Ukrainians, according to the research of Sopotnicki (1921), at the end of November 1918 the Polish army had 20 thousand soldiers, and at the end of April 1919 – 60 thousand people. The number of Polish troops, in particular in the "combat readiness" state, was constantly growing: from 23 thousand people (January 15, 1919) to 203,264 people (August 15, 1919) (Shankovskyi, 1974, p. 30).

It is important to clarify that today it is next to impossible to argue that the potential object of aggression had inclinations to defend their interests, as it includes the use of armed force. The external dimension of this idea was realized through the development of the defense system with the help of allies in the conflict (we do not take into account diplomatic and military missions), in the case of Ukrainians in Galicia in 1918–1919, they remained alone face to face with their enemy of the time – Poles. At the same time, Poles could rely on the Entente as their ally, in particular regarding the issue of human resources and weapons supply.

Relying on the modern understanding and interpretation of things, one cannot adequately assess the second potential – aggressive one. In particular, it is next to impossible to come up with the exact amount and types of weapons, which were actually used by the parties to the conflict in 1918–1919 not only for defense, but also for the physical destruction of the enemy.

According to the available data Ukrainians had 11 cannons and Poles had 18 cannons among the heavy weapons used during the battles for Lviv (Kuzma, 1960, p. 395). Certain sources stated that at the beginning of December 1918 the Galician Army had 40 cannons and in between 7 and 9 thousand units of hand firearms (rifles, carbines, etc.) (Shankovskyi, 1980, p. 3344; Krezub, 1933, p. 59). In April 1919, the Polish army had in their possession 100 cannons and 5 armored trains, in June 1919 there were 150 cannons and the same 5 armored trains (Sopotnicki, 1921, p. 13). A striking difference in the amount of armaments is evident if only to take into account the following fact: in December 1918, one of the Ukrainian military task forces got into a fight with Poles, the former had 800 units of weapons against 2200-2300 units of the latter, similarly, another battle's weapon ratio was as follows: 600–700 units of weaponry in Ukrainians' hands against 2400 pieces in Polish (Krezub, 1933, p. 57, 59). The consequences of the first two months of the Polish-Ukrainian war (November 12 – January 12, 1919) could serve as proofs of the real aggressive potential resulting from the operational initiative of the Polish army in Galicia. After all, according to Shankovskyi (1974), out of 46 operations of Ukrainians only 20 were (p. 111).

The estimated number of Ukrainian and Polish troops as of June 1919, for instance, cannot provide a simple and quick answer about the presence of aggressive potential as all the data concerning the amount of soldiers are different. In particular, the Polish army in its combat readiness status as of June 28, 1919 had 36,613 bayonets, 2,144 sabers, 797 machine guns, and 207 cannons against 24,400 bayonets, 400 sabers, 376 machine guns, and 144 cannons of the Ukrainian army (Shankovskyi, 1974, p. 169), (according to Shankovsky's (1974) explanation, "bayonets" are the amount of infantry riflemen; "sabers" are the cavalry fighters) (p. 228). However, as of July 11 of the same year, the weapon and human ratio was somewhat different: Poles had 39,537 bayonets, 837 machine guns, and 204 cannons, while Ukrainians had 22,360 bayonets, 464 machine guns, and 120 cannons (Shankovskyi, 1974, p. 169) (there are no mentions of "sabers").

One can assume that the level of aggression could also be measured in the casualty numbers of the Polish and Ukrainian troops. As an example let's consider data on the battles results in Lviv in between November 1–21, 1918: in case of Poles there is information on 188 people lost (105 people killed in between November 1–11, and 83 people in the period of November 12–21) (Diedyk, 2018, p. 185; Diedyk, 2020, p. 150). Such data leads to the following analysis: firstly, if we consider the

data on the number of Polish soldiers as from November 11, 1918 a basis (5,094 people) and compare it to the number of killed servicemen (105) (Diedyk, 2018, p. 185), we will receive the losses rate equal to 2.06 percent; secondly, as of November 21, 1918, the Polish army included 5,472 people and 83 of them were killed (Diedyk, 2020, p. 150), that amounted to 1.51 percent of losses on the Polish side.

In case of the Ukrainian side and its losses estimation, as Kuzma (1960) put it, "it is hard to accurately state the number due to the lack of statistical data". According to the information he provided, "during the second week of November" there were approximately 90 people lost, and "during the withdrawal of the Ukrainian army from Lviv" this number could rise to around 250 killed (p. 438). Assuming that the first number corresponded to the period of battles in between November 1–11 and taking into account the total number of Ukrainian soldiers as of November 9, 1918 (there were 1997 people in the "combat readiness" state, including 87 senior officers and 1,910 riflemen) (Diedyk, 2018, p. 187), we receive 4.5 percent of losses from the Ukrainian side. However, talking about the period, which could be dubbed "after the second week of November", as Kuzma (1960) put it, Instead, if we are talking about a period that can only conditionally be considered, if one takes the number of Ukrainian soldiers as of November 21 (3305 soldiers of the "combat readiness" state, including 120 sergeants, and 3,185 riflemen) (p. 394) and the probable amount of 160 people killed, the victim rate would be 4.84 percent.

In terms of reliability of various data of quantitative nature regarding the Ukrainian side, one should take into account what S. Shukhevych says about the "human factor" influencing any statistical information: "[...] each commander was a big egoist and wanted his military unit to receive the biggest supply in terms of both people and material, and therefore, they would submit false reports on the state of their military units. Our commanders were also guilty of this sin or feature, and therefore, the reports on the number of soldiers in the military groups did not correspond the reality (my italics – I. M.) [...] Any inspection of the state of groups at that time was out of question" (Shukhevych, 1929, p. 105). Finally, there exists such a factor as the enemy tendency to aggression. Not only is it connected with the conflict of the opposing sides, but it also has its own dynamics.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The rival states – the proclaimed Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR a.k.a ZUNR) and the restored Polish Republic – were not alike in their reliance on quite different tools of conflict, in particular regarding the use of military potential during the Polish-Ukrainian war in Galicia in 1918–1919. Namely, there took place constant militarization of East Galician society, economy and states in general. In the context of military and political conflict it was extremely important to provide for the military needs and to maintain military rhetoric of power.. Nowadays the issue of whether the militarization of Ukrainians in Galicia (mainly civilian population, by the way) had place as a matter of fact is rather rhetorical. In particular, one cannot know of the amount of weapons in possession of civilian Ukrainians in Galicia. Consequently, for a number of totally justifiable reasons which are still not enough to fully explain the short political life of the Western Ukrainian state in its various forms in between 1918–1923, it proves impossible to fully project the probable potential of ethno-security during the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919, relying on the WUPR (ZUNR) potential alone. Therefore, further research on the potentials of the opposing forces, their influence, rises and falls will still be crucial for the study and determination of the potential of Galicia during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1914–1923, in particular regarding the security plane.

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Монолатій Іван. Потенціали етнобезпеки під час польсько-української війни за Галичину 1918 року. *Журнал Прикарпатського університету імені Василя Стефаника*, 9 (2) (2022), 18–24.

Моделювання потенціалу Західноукраїнської Народної Республіки (ЗУНР) на основі сучасних теорій і пропозицій політиків і геополітиків є важливим чинником у вивченні позитивів і негативів досліджуваної етнополітичної сфери, оскільки виявляють її безпекову та геостратегічну складові. На думку автора, найлогічнішою щодо уявленої моделі потенціалу ЗУНР була ескалація з точки зору сильнішої сторони (поляки), зокрема з огляду на ескалацію озброєння. Вона виступала за умов несиметричної нерівноваги: слабша сторона (українці) переносили «важкість» ескалації на ідеологічні та морально-світоглядні проблеми. Дослідження показує, що потенціал етнічної безпеки ЗУНР розумівся сучасниками, з огляду на постійні загрози воєнного часу, надто вузько: виключно як потенціал Збройних сил – Галицької Армії. Для виваженої оцінки потенціалів етнічної безпеки

українців і поляків важливими є показники «оборонного» і «агресивного» потенціалів, їх співвідношення у розрізі боїв за Львів 1-21 листопада 1918 року.

Автор припускає, що моделювання потенціалу ЗУНР дасть можливість сучасній історіографії Української революції 1914–1923 рр. з'ясувати морфологію сили держави через з'ясування природи політичної влади, можливостей функціонування державного організму, реалізації його стратегічних цілей тощо у її західноукраїнському сегменті.

Ключові слова: «оборонний» і «агресивний» потенціал, українсько-польська війна, етнічна безпека, Галичина, ЗУНР.