

УДК 94(477.86)

THE ACTIVITY OF J. BARTELLEMI PEACEFUL MISSION IN THE WORKS OF M. LOZYNSKYI

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У пропонованій статті проаналізовано відображення дипломатичної та військової діяльності миротворчої місії Ж. Бартелемі під час польсько-української війни 1918–1919 рр. у працях Михайла Лозинського. Розглянуто причетність М. Лозинського до важливих зовнішньополітичних акцій ЗОУНР, а саме його безпосередню участь у перемовинах з вище згаданою місією країн Антанти та особистий погляд дипломата на ці події.

Запропонована стаття присвячується ґрунтовному аналізу дипломатичних аспектів у наукових роботах М. Лозинського та розкриваються погляди автора в питанні наслідків діяльності місії Антанти під проводом Ж. Бартелемі щодо майбутнього ЗОУНР.

Теперішній етап розвитку історичної науки в Україні дає можливість переосмислити і звернутися до вивчення життя та діяльності осіб, які брали активну участь у національно-визвольному русі українського народу 1917–1923 рр. Однак одним із найважливіх завдань сучасної історичної науки та дипломатії є дослідження не лише життєвого шляху знакових персоналій, а й змісту їх професійної діяльності та її впливу на суспільно-політичні процеси.

Важливим є питання вивчення наукових надбань фахівців попередніх поколінь, які заклали підвалини розвитку сучасної української науки. У такому контексті ми розглядаємо праці та саму постать М. Лозинського, який увійшов в історію насамперед як громадський діяч, член уряду ЗОУНР, дипломат, науковець і публіцист.

Ключові слова: Михайло Лозинський, Східна Галичина, ЗУНР, Польща, Ж. Бартелемі, миротворча місія, польсько-українська війна.

During the existence of the Soviet totalitarian regime, a large number of names of Ukrainian scholars, owing to ideological restrictions, were silenced, and their scientific achievements remained outside the context of the science’s development. It’s need to include the well-known Ukrainian public and political figure M. Lozynskyi to them, who stood at the origins of the Ukrainian national liberation idea, was one of its outstanding creators.

The historian I. Kedrin, characterizing M. Lozynskyi, noted that he was “a person with high education, a publicist, a politician, a former member of the State Secretariat of the WUPR, and later a member of his delegation to the World Conference in Paris, was the first-rate connoisseur of the then-historical events and one of the few connoisseurs of various backstage machinations”¹.

The relevance of this study is primarily determined by the generalization of the scientific heritage of M. Lozynskyi, the determination of his assessment of the diplomatic and military efforts which were made during the Paris Peace Conference, the interference of the Supreme Council of the Entente in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, in connection with which the Ukrainian side faced with a dictate and was forced to the truce.

As a result, the unacceptable conditions imposed by the mission led by J. Bartellemi “under the dictation” of the Poles, according to M. Lozynskyi, pushed the WRUPR government to take

¹ Kedrin I. The bright and gloomy years: “Galicia” by M. Lozynski and why it was reprinted. *Lozynskyi M. Galichin in 1918–1920*. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 7.



decisive action. The purpose of the article is an attempt to analyze M. Lozynskyi scientific and historical heritage in the context of the activities of the peacekeeping mission of J. Bartellemi y in resolving the conflict between Poland and the WRUPR, and also to highlight his vision of the processes that took place in Eastern Galicia during the specified period.

M. Lozynskyi entered as a well-known political figure, a scientist, a publicist and an interpreter in the Ukrainian public opinion of the first third of the XX century.

The collapse of the Austro-Hungary in the autumn of 1918, the proclamation of the WUPR, the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian war, prompted M. Lozynskyi to become an active participant in the state-building process in the western Ukrainian lands. In early November 1918, he was introduced into the Ukrainian National Council (UNC), in which he conducted the active state-building work.

From the first days of its existence, the ZUNR suffered aggression from Poland and territorial losses, while the process of building the foundations of statehood only began. As to these events, M. Lozynskyi recalled: “The biggest jury of the WRUPR government was a war with Poland. At first, the main hopes are laid upon the help of Great Ukraine, saying that with such assistance, Polacians will be able to propel the ethnographic borders of Eastern Galicia up to the ethnographic borders of the Eastern Galicia and make them to conclude as if not peace, then at least a truce on the basis of ensuring the ethnographic borders of the Ukrainian territory. The rest the Peace Conference will make in Paris, where UPR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) had sent its delegation. The Peace Conference recognizes the UPR and according to the principle of self-determination of peoples to correct the borders’s deal”².

However, the Directory’s authority, as a result of the capture of the Bilshovyk forces of the strategic initiative during January 1919, lost its campaign on the Left Bank and in the beginning of February the troops of the UPR retreated to the right bank of the Dnipro. On February 5, 1919, Ukrainian troops left Kiev and had been retreating every time closer to the Galician borders. The WRUPR was forced to send the military assistance to the Directory. For such minds, the Galician government decided to act independently. Western Ukrainians also hoped for help from the Entente countries. They believed in its statement that Poland had to rebel only on Polish lands (Part VIII of the Versailles’ Treaty) And Eastern Galicia is originally the Ukrainian land, the WRUPR government believed: Antanta will say to the Poles to stop an aggressive war against Eastern Galicia. M. Lozynskyi rightly remarked: “This Ukrainian faith is awaiting for great disappointment”³.

In early February 1919, the command of the UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army), reorganizing the troops and bringing the number of front lines about 55–60 thousand people, decided to hold the so-called Vovchukhov offensive for the liberation of the capital of the WRUPR of Lviv and Przemysl and the subsequent exit to the line of the river Sian. Already on February 17, 1919, by attacking the Polish positions along the Sudova Vyshnia – Gorodok 3rd Galician Corps came out very close to the Lviv – Peremyshl railway line. Thus, the first part of the operational plan, which included the environment of Lviv, was practically fulfilled. However, the successful begining of operation was stopped at the request of the Supreme Council of the Entente States, which sent a mission to Lviv, led by French General J. Bartellemi for the talkss with the government the WRUPR⁴. In February 1919, M. Lozynskyi, as a member of the Ukrainian delegation, participated in negotiations with the Entente J. Bartellemi, who proposed the belligerents the truce.

On February 22, 1919, the talks began in the town Khodoriv with the participation of the commander of the UGA General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko and the peacekeeping mission of J. Bartellemi. The Entente mission included also English general C. de Viart, the American professor R. Lord, the Italian Major Stabile, etc/.. With regard to these events, M. Lozynskyi noted: “This commission, after a few weeks of life in Warsaw and Lviv, appealed to the Ukrainian side on February

² Lozynskyi M. Halychyna 1918–1920. Vienna, 1922. 228 p. ; 2nd form. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 73–74.

³ Lozynskyi M. For the State Independence of Galicia. Why Ukrainian Galicia can not come to Poland. Vienna, 1921. P. 12.

⁴ Pinak E., Chmir M. The Army of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 / under the edit K. Galushka. Kharkiv : Book Club “Family Leisure Club”, 2017. P. 124–125.

22, 1919, with the extortion of the termination of the weapon for the purpose of negotiating about the armistice. The extortion about the termination of the weapon was put down categorically, as *conditio sine qua non* negotiation of the armistice; when the Ukrainian side does not approve of this claim, this will mean that it rejects the intervention of the World Conference, and it will be responsible for the further conducting the war”⁵. The extortion about the termination of the weapon was put down categorically, as *conditio sine qua non* negotiation of the armistice; when the Ukrainian side does not approve of this claim, this will mean that it rejects the intervention of the World Conference, and it will be responsible for the further conducting the war”⁶. Of course, such conditions were unacceptable for the Ukrainian side, given the successful development of the Vovchukhiv offensive operation. we will notice that the WRUPR was represented only by the military, who were even against a temporary armistice in the midst of an offensive. After a heated debate, an agreement was reached on the transfer of negotiations to Lviv. Contrary to the military, E. Petrushevych eventually ordered the leaders of the Galician delegation in Lviv, Colonel M. Tarnavskiy and L. Bachynskiy, to sign an armistice agreement⁷.

At that moment the military-strategic situation was Sian on the side of the WRUPR. The Galician army kept almost the whole of Eastern Galicia along the River, and in this controlled territory the “Polish wedge” crashed along the Przemysl – Lviv route. After a heated debate, an agreement was reached on the transfer of negotiations to Lviv. So, the WRUPR government only under the onslaught of threats to the Entente Commission agreed to a truce, which was set up around the front on February 25, 1919 at 6 o’clock in the morning. On the same day, a delegation of the State Secretariat of the WRUPR went to Lviv for the conducting of the negotiations about the armistice with the following composition: the Secretary of State for Legal Affairs Osyp Burakynskiy, Dr. Stepan Vytvitskiy, Dr. Mykhailo Lozynskiy, Dr. Volodymyr Okhrimovych, Volodymyr Temnitskiy, regiment. Guzhkovskiy, Ataman Rozhankovskiy, regiment. Slusarchuk, the colonel. Fidelier and as an interpreter Bonn. The first information meeting of the Bartellemi mission and the WRUPR delegation was held on February 26, during the course of the discussions, as M. Lozynskiy recalled, it was clear that the “allianty” were well-informed by the Poles in their favor. The evidence of the Ukrainian side had no effect on their decision. The same day, in the presence of the Bartellemi mission, was conducted the joint meeting of the delegations of the WRUPR and Poland. The main problem around which there was a dispute, was the question of demarcation line. But on this basis, the parties did not reach agreement⁸.

The talks in Lviv took place under the brutal pressure of the Entente commissars who tried in every way to act in favor of the Poles and treated to the representatives of the WRUPR superficially. M. Lozynskiy wrote: “Thanks to the Poles, who apparently had certain commissions of Bartellemi commission for their cause, this meeting was merely an annoying comedy. On our request of the line of Sian, the Poles responded with the demand of the Zbruch line. When our delegation, in spite of all the apparent clues, began to discuss seriously and pointed on the possibility of the above-mentioned steps in defining a democratic line, the Poles, as the longest concession, filed the line Mount Popadia – Kalush – Halych – Rohatyn – Peremyshliany – Berestechko. It is obvious that the meeting was ended with the statement that the parties can not reach an understanding”⁹.

In the negotiations with the Poles, Simon Petliura, head of the UPR Directorate, was also interested: “At the same time, finding out about the arrival of J. Bartellemi, on February 24, 1919, S. Petliura arrived in Stanislavov, and a day later he met with E. Petrushevych. The main Ataman advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposals of General Bartellemi, because it will open the way for Ukraine to be recognized in Europe and will be able to get help with

⁵ Lozynskiy M. *Halychyna 1918–1920*. Vienna, 1922. 228 p. ; 2nd form. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 74–75.

⁶ *Ibid.* P. 81.

⁷ Lytvyn M. *Ukrainian-Polish War 1918–1919*. Lviv : Institute of Ukrainian Studies named after I. Krypiakevych, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine ; Institute of Central and Eastern Europe, 1998. P. 266.

⁸ Lozynskiy M. *Halychyna 1918–1920*. Vienna, 1922. 228 s. ; 2nd form. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 75.

⁹ Lozynskiy M. *Galicia at the World Conference in Paris*. Kaminets, 1919. P. 10.



ammunition and military goods to continue the struggle for independence". He also expressed this position in a letter to the general M. Udovichenko: "Although the demarcation line did not meet the interests of the Galician people, I insisted on accepting it, because we would have achieved this: a) the actual recognition of Ukraine by the Entente; b) would be have some possibilities to create the bases for delivery of ammunition from Europe; c) would rely on Europe in our struggle against the Bolsheviks – ostensibly, with Moscow. Galicians, with the help of Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who has never been guided in state affairs, rejected these conditions ..." At this time, M. Lozynskyi also considered it is necessary to accept the circumstances of a truce, because it would have allowed to strengthen Galician statehood and to save it to resolve the political situation of the east of Europe. However, E. Petrushevych was guided by his own motives. After all, the people of Galicia could not understand such actions – "having a large army and almost equally holding in the fight against the Poles, to give the capital of the region and an industrial important area"¹⁰.

On February 27, 1919, J. Bartellemi's commission with the delegation of the WRUPR went for Hodorov, then the seat of the main UGA apartment, to see the main ataman S. Petliura, who "came there with the President of the UNC E. Petrushevych and the president of the State Secretariat C. Golubovych..."¹¹. Bartellemi's peacekeeping mission wanted to know what strength Petliura represented to fight Bolshevik Russia. In his turn, Petliura emphasized that Ukraine represents a great moral force that can be turned into a real military force, depending on whether the Entente recognizes the status of the UPR and will give the young state financial and technical assistance.

On this occasion, M. Lozynskyi recalled: "Regarding to Galicia, S. Petliura noted only in general that the Ukrainian nation can only turn its full force against Bolshevism, when it will have a secured nationality existence from the West. As clearly as Golubovich and Petrushevich demanded from Petliura, he did not decided and didn't declared that the retention of the Eastern Galicia in the ethnographic borders of the Ukrainian People's Republic is an unconditional demanding of the whole of Ukraine. It seems that even then Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern Galicia, to get peace with Poland for them and the recognition of the Entente"¹².

In his work "Galicia in 1918–1920" M. Lozynskyi bitterly noted that in terms of foreign policy relations between the governments of the WRUPR and the UPR consisted so that "... the case of the war with Poland for Eastern Galicia and the right to inheritance of Austria-Hungary were the affairs of the Western Region, and all the other cases – the affair of the whole Ukrainian People's Republic"¹³.

Before giving the project of the the armistice, J. Bartellemi pronounced the speech, after that M. Lozynskyi made a conclusion that "all this speech indicated that the decision of the commission wasn't in our favor. To make us to accept the wrong decision, the general. Bartellemi on the one hand painted the strength of the poles with the bright paints, which is preparing for us, and on the other hand the wrath of the Entente, which will fall upon us, and on the other hand, those graces of the Entente that await to us when we make a decision"¹⁴.

On February 28, 1919, the Bartellemi mission offered the delegation of the WRUPR the project of armistice. On the basis of this project, Poland have to receive not only a small part of Eastern Galicia, which was still conquered, but the WRUPR had to concede Poland with large areas of the Ukrainian territory, which UGA held firmly in its hands, together with oil fields on the vicinity of Drohobych and Borislav, which constituted the main article of the economic's forces of the WRUPR. In general, Galicians had to give way to about 1/3 of their own territory of Eastern Galicia. Representatives of the Entente did not express any real guarantees regarding the future of Galicia. As to the project, M. Lozynskyi made the following conclusion: "It is clear from all this that the project of the ceasefire, which is proposed by the Bartellemi commission, was a one-sided dictate, which the commission, decided to throw Ukrainians on the basis of understanding with the Poles. And the

¹⁰ Lozynskyi M. Galicia 1918–1920. Vienna, 1922 228 p. ; 2nd form. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 76.

¹¹ Ibid. P. 77.

¹² Ibid. P. 76.

¹³ Ibid. P. 77.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 79.

comedy of negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation was arranged when the project has already decided and made"¹⁵. M. Lozynskyi, as a member of the WRUPR delegation, stated that "in the sense of moral responsibility to his people, the Ukrainian government could not accept such conditions of the armistice. It was compelled to decide to continue defending of native lands with the blood of its sons, and asked the Entente's states to find out the reasons why it could not accept the project of Bertellemi commission and asked for a new, fair solution"¹⁶. It should be noted that the denial of the Government of the WRUPR significantly complicated the activities of the delegation at a conference in Paris, where they began to give greater preferences to the Poles.

On February 28, 1919, General J. Bartellemi warned WUPR representatives O. Burachynskyi, S. Vytvytskyi and M. Lozynskyi for the last time: if the Galician people do not accept the peace, they will soon be sorry for having to deal with the army of General Galler. Receiving the armistice project, the Ukrainian delegation left Lviv on the same day to transfer it to the State Secretariat of the WRUPR. After reviewing this project, the Western Ukrainian government sent the radiotelegram to Entente countries on March 4, 1919. It was mentioned there that "... the decision of this mission trampled on the principle of self-determination of peoples and became on the side of Polish imperialism. In this decision, the mission has sown in our people a mistrust to the Entente and to those high principles of the courage that the Entente proclaimed... we are forced to fight with Poles to defense our land... we want to live in peace and friendship with the states of the Entente and hope for their help to fight the Polish invasion... we are ready to stop the military steps against the Poles at any moment, but on the basis of a fair decision that will free our territory from the Polish invasion"¹⁷.

M. Lozynskyi recalled that despite of the great desire to support the good relations with Entente, the delegation of the WRUPR could not accept the shameful proposals. Galician Ukrainians, whether it was at the level of the government representative at the negotiations of M. Lozynskyi, or at the level of the ordinary archer, the UGA could not accept the offer of the Entente mission. "We can not get along with the Poles – wrote on April 29, 1919 in the Stanislavov newspaper "Svoboda" the officer of the military press Taras Franko. – They crave from us the line of the Buh River, the bridge Berezhnan, Stryi and the petroleum mines near Drohobych, and this Ukrainian can not accept any way"¹⁸. So, at that time when the WRUPR government announced its decision, that all proceeded in such way to reject the project of J. Bartellemi's mission.

The researchers of the Polish-Ukrainian war often describe the failure of the Hodogrow talks regarding to the truce in February 1919 under the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference as a key moment in the war, as he has identified a radical shift in the politics of the Entente leadership in favor of Poland. First of all, this accelerated the expulsion of the army of Galler to Poland, whose presence led to the decision of the fate of war in Poland's interests. The mass media of Western European countries, in particular France and Britain, used the failure of the Bartellemi mission for the formation anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the international community. Some researchers argue that the breakup of the armistice has damaged the leadership of the WRUPR, which has chosen the strategy of the fatalist: either all or nothing. Some believed that it was necessary to preserve an independent state at least any on a part of the region's territory. M. Lozynskyi, a diplomat, denied them, who remarked that the adoption of the Bartellemi project would not save the Ukrainian state from either Poland or from Russia¹⁹.

Thus, the Entente's attempt to reach the peace at the expense of the WUPR and return the two warring armies to the east, against the Bolsheviks, failed. However, the Paris truce imposed by the warring parties was used differently. The Poles significantly strengthened their position thanks to the Galler's army who was sent to the East Galicia, which determined the result of the war. M. Lozynskyi

¹⁵ Lozynskyi M. *Galicia 1918–1920*. Vienna, 1922 228 p. ; 2nd form. New York : Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 78.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 81.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* P. 83.

¹⁸ Lozynskyi M. *For the State Independence of Galicia. Why Ukrainian Galicia can not come to Poland*. Vienna, 1921. P. 13.

¹⁹ *Freedom*. 1919. April 29.



fairly summed up: “in this war, at first the World Conference acted as an intermediary, and then as a judge”²⁰.

M. Lozynsky's activities were properly evaluated and on March 10, 1919, at a meeting of the Council of the Ukrainian National Council, he was appointed as a fellow (deputy) secretary of the state for foreign affairs of the WRUPR and instructed by the secretariat, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs V. Panaieko was at the Paris Peaceful Conference as deputy Head of the UPR delegation²¹.

So, against the background of socio-political processes of the West Ukrainian lands of the first quarter of the twentieth century. M. Lozynskyi became an active participant in Ukrainian national life. M. Lozynskyi's state-building and diplomatic talent is characterized by new theoretical positions, originality of thoughts, which became relevant in modern conditions.

ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ МИРОТВОРЧОЇ МІСІЇ Ж. БАРТЕЛЕМІ ПІД ЧАС ПОЛЬСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ 1918–1919 рр. У ПРАЦЯХ МИХАЙЛА ЛОЗИНСЬКОГО

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Summary

The article deals with the reflection of the diplomatic and military activity of the peacekeeping mission of J. Bartellemi during the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919 in the writings of Mykhailo Lozynskyi. It is considered the involvement of M. Lozynskyi in important foreign-policy actions of the WUPR (Western Ukrainian People's Republic), namely, his direct participation in negotiations with the aforementioned mission of the Entente countries and the personal view of the diplomat on these events.

Keywords: M. Lozynskyi, Eastern Galicia, WRUPR (Western Ukrainian People's Republic), Poland, J. Bartellemi, peacekeeping mission, Polish-Ukrainian war.

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²⁰ Lozynskyi M. Galichina in 1918–1920. Vienna, 1922. 228 p. ; 2nd form. New-York: Chervona Kalyna, 1970. P. 84.

²¹ Kedrin I. Life – events – people: remembrance and comments. New-York, 1976. P. 32.

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Надійшла до редакції 12 вересня 2019 р.